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Abstract 
[Excerpt] A recurring issue in constitutional law concerns the extent to which the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment imposes constraints on the provision of public aid to private sectarian schools. The 
U.S. Supreme Court's past jurisprudence construed the clause to impose severe restrictions on aid given 
directly to sectarian elementary and secondary schools but to be less restrictive when given to colleges or 
indirectly in the form of tax benefits or vouchers. The Court's later decisions loosened the constitutional 
limitations on both direct and indirect aid. 
This report gives a brief overview of the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause in this area and analyzes the categories of aid that have been addressed by the Court. The report 
explains which categories have been held to be constitutionally permissible or impermissible, both at the 
elementary and secondary school level and at the postsecondary level. The report also briefly addresses 
a set of cases (Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn; Garriott v. Winn) currently before the 
Court regarding the constitutionality of an Arizona statute that permits individuals to claim a tax credit for 
certain donations to school tuition organizations that use the funds for scholarships to private and, in 
some instances, religious schools. 
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Summary 
A recurring issue in constitutional law concerns the extent to which the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment imposes constraints on the provision of public aid to private sectarian 
schools. The U.S. Supreme Court's past jurisprudence construed the clause to impose severe 
restrictions on aid given directly to sectarian elementary and secondary schools but to be less 
restrictive when given to colleges or indirectly in the form of tax benefits or vouchers. The 
Court's later decisions loosened the constitutional limitations on both direct and indirect aid 
This report gives a brief overview of the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause in this area and analyzes the categories of aid that have been addressed by 
the Court. The report explains which categories have been held to be constitutionally permissible 
or impermissible, both at the elementary and secondary school level and at the postsecondary 
level. The report also briefly addresses a set of cases (Arizona Christian School Tuition 
Organization v. Winn; Garriott v. Winn) currently before the Court regarding the constitutionality 
of an Arizona statute that permits individuals to claim a tax credit for certain donations to school 
tuition organizations that use the funds for scholarships to private and, in some instances, 
religious schools. 
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Overview 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion...."1 The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the 
Establishment Clause, in general, to mean that government is prohibited from sponsoring or 
financing religious instruction or indoctrination. But the Court has drawn a constitutional 
distinction between aid that flows directly to sectarian schools and aid that benefits such schools 
indirectly as the result of voucher or tax benefit programs. 
With respect to direct aid, the Court has typically applied the tripartite test it first articulated in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman? The Lemon test requires that an aid program (1) serve a secular legislative 
purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster an 
excessive entanglement with religion. Because education is an important state goal, the secular 
purpose aspect of this test has rarely been a problem for direct aid programs. But prior to the 
Court's latest decisions, both the primary effect and entanglement prongs were substantial 
barriers. To avoid a primary effect of advancing religion, the Court required direct aid programs 
to be limited to secular use and struck them down if they were not so limited.3 But even if the aid 
was so limited, the Court often found the primary effect prong violated anyway because it 
presumed that in pervasively sectarian institutions it was impossible for public aid to be limited to 
secular use.4 Alternatively, it often held that direct aid programs benefiting pervasively sectarian 
institutions were unconstitutional because government had to so closely monitor the institutions' 
use of the aid to be sure the limitation to secular use was honored that it became excessively 
entangled with the institutions.5 These tests were a particular problem for direct aid to sectarian 
elementary and secondary schools, because the Court presumed that such schools were 
pervasively sectarian. It presumed to the contrary with respect to religious colleges. 
The Court's decisions in Agostini v. Felton6 and Mitchell v. Helms,7 however, have recast these 
tests in a manner that has lowered the constitutional barriers to direct aid to sectarian schools. The 
Court has abandoned the presumption that sectarian elementary and secondary schools are so 
pervasively sectarian that direct aid either results in the advancement of religion or fosters 
excessive entanglement. It has also abandoned the assumption that government must engage in an 
intrusive monitoring of such institutions' use of direct aid. The Court still requires that direct aid 
serve a secular purpose and not lead to excessive entanglement. But it has recast the primary 
effect test to require that the aid be secular in nature, that its distribution be based on religiously 
neutral criteria, and that it not be used for religious indoctrination.8 
1
 U.S. Const, amend. I. The First Amendment has been held to apply to the states as well as to the federal government. 
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause) and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 
1 (1947) (Establishment Clause). 
2
 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
3
 See, e.g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
4
 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
5
 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
6
 521 US. 203 (1997). 
7
 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
8
 See Agostini, 521 U.S. 203. 
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The Court's past jurisprudence imposed fewer restraints on indirect aid to sectarian schools such 
as tax benefits or vouchers. The Court still required such aid programs to serve a secular purpose; 
but it did not apply the secular use and entanglement tests applicable to direct aid. The key 
constitutional question was whether the initial beneficiaries of the aid (i.e., parents or 
schoolchildren) had a genuinely independent choice about whether to use the aid for educational 
services from secular or religious schools.9 If the universe of choices available was almost 
entirely religious, the Court held the program unconstitutional because the government, in effect, 
dictated by the design of the program that a religious option be chosen. But if religious options 
did not predominate, the Court held the program constitutional even if parents chose to receive 
services from pervasively sectarian schools. Moreover, in its decision in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris,™ the Court legitimated an even broader range of indirect aid programs by holding that the 
evaluation of the universe of choice available to parents is not confined to the private schools at 
which the voucher aid can be used but includes as well all of the public school options open to 
parents. 
Specific Decisions Concerning Public Aid to 
Sectarian Elementary and Secondary Schools 
Bus Transportation 
In Everson v. Board of Education,11 the Court held it to be constitutionally permissible for a local 
government to subsidize bus transportation between home and school for parochial 
schoolchildren as well as public schoolchildren. The Court said the subsidy was essentially a 
general welfare program that helped children get from home to school and back safely. In 
Wolman v. Walter,12 on the other hand, the Court held the Establishment Clause to be violated by 
the public subsidy of field trip transportation for parochial schoolchildren on the grounds field 
trips are an integral part of the school's curriculum and wholly controlled by the school. 
Textbooks and Instructional Materials 
In several decisions, the Court has upheld as constitutional the loan of secular textbooks to 
children in sectarian elementary and secondary schools,13 and in Wolman v. Walter,14 it upheld the 
inclusion in such a textbook loan program of related manuals and reusable workbooks. The Court 
has reasoned that the textbooks are by their nature limited to secular use and that the loan 
programs are general welfare programs that only incidentally aid sectarian schools. In contrast, 
the Court in Meek v. Pittenger15 and Wolman v. Walter16 held the provision of instructional 
9
 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
10
 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
"330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
12
 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
13
 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); and Wolman v. Walter, 




 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
Congressional Research Service 2 
The Law of Church and State: Public Aid to Sectarian Schools 
materials other than textbooks, such as periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, films, sound 
recordings, projection and recording equipment, and lab equipment, to sectarian schools or 
sectarian school children to be unconstitutional because such aid provides substantial aid to the 
sectarian enterprise as a whole and inevitably has a primary effect of advancing religion. But in 
Mitchell v. Helms, the Court overturned those aspects of Meek and Wolman and held it to be 
constitutional for government to include sectarian schools in a program providing instructional 
materials (including computer hardware and software) on the grounds: (1) the aid was secular in 
nature; (2) was distributed according to religiously neutral criteria; and (3) could be limited to 
secular use within the sectarian schools without any intrusive government monitoring. 
Teachers and Other Personnel 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman?1 the Court held it to be unconstitutional for a state to subsidize parochial 
school teachers of such secular subjects as math, foreign languages, and the physical sciences, 
either by way of a direct subsidy of such teachers' salaries or by means of a "purchase of secular 
services" program. The Court reasoned that the state would have to engage in intrusive 
monitoring to ensure that the subsidized teachers did not inculcate religion; and it held such 
monitoring to excessively entangle government with the schools. For a similar reason in Meek v. 
Pittenger,8 the Court struck down a program of "auxiliary services" to children in nonpublic 
schools which included enrichment and remedial educational services, counseling and 
psychological services, and speech and hearing therapy by public personnel. And in Aguilar v. 
Felton,™ it held unconstitutional the provision of remedial and enrichment services to eligible 
children in sectarian schools by public school teachers under the Title I program if they were 
provided on the premises of the sectarian schools. Finally, in City of Grand Rapids v. Ball,20 the 
Court also struck down a similar state program of remedial and enrichment services as well as a 
program in which the school district hired parochial school teachers to provide after-school 
extracurricular programs to their students on the premises of their sectarian schools. 
But in Agostini v. Felton,2] the Court overturned the Aguilar decision and the pertinent parts of 
Meek and Ball and upheld as constitutional the provision of remedial and enrichment educational 
services to sectarian schoolchildren by public teachers on the premises of sectarian schools. In 
addition, the Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District12 upheld as constitutional the 
provision at public expense under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of a 
sign-language interpreter for a disabled child attending a sectarian secondary school. In both 
cases, the Court reasoned that the programs were general welfare programs available to students 
without regard to whether they attended public or private (sectarian) schools; and in Zobrest, it 
reasoned as well that the parents controlled the decision about whether the assistance took place 
in a sectarian school or a public school. 
(...continued) 
16
 433 U.S. 229(1977). 
17
 403 US. 602(1971). 
18
 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
19
 473 U.S. 402 (1985) 
20
 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
21
 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
22
 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
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Tests and State-Required Reports 
In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education™ the Court struck down a program reimbursing 
sectarian schools for the costs of administering and compiling the results of teacher-prepared tests 
in subjects required to be taught by state law because the teachers controlled the tests and might 
include religious content in therrL In contrast, in Wolman v. Walter™ the Court upheld a program 
in which a state provided standardized tests in secular subjects and related scoring services to 
nonpublic schoolchildren, including those in religious schools. Similarly, in Committee for Public 
Education v. Regan,25 the Court upheld a program that reimbursed sectarian schools for the costs 
of administering such state-prepared tests as the regents exams, comprehensive achievement 
exams, and college qualifications tests. In both cases, the Court reasoned that such tests were 
limited by their nature to secular use. In Regan, the Court also upheld as constitutional a program 
that reimbursed sectarian and other private schools for the costs of complying with state-
mandated record-keeping and reporting requirements about student enrollment and attendance, 
faculty qualifications, the content of the curriculum, and physical facilities. The Court reasoned 
that the requirements were imposed by the state and did not involve the teaching process. 
Maintenance and Repair Costs 
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,26 the Court struck down as unconstitutional a state 
program subsidizing some of the costs incurred by sectarian schools for the maintenance and 
repair of their facilities, including costs incurred for heating, lighting, renovation, and cleaning, 
on the grounds the subsidy inevitably aided the schools' religious functions. 
Vouchers and Tax Benefits 
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist27 and Sloan v. Lemon?* the Court held 
unconstitutional programs which provided tuition grants and tax benefits to the parents of 
children attending private schools, most of which were religious. In both instances, the Court 
found that the programs benefited only those with children in private schools, that most of those 
schools were sectarian, and that the programs had a primary purpose and effect of subsidizing 
such schools. 
In three other decisions, however, the Court upheld voucher and tax benefit programs where the 
benefits were available to children attending public as well as private schools or their parents. 
Mueller v. Allen29 involved a state program giving a tax deduction to the parents of all elementary 
and secondary schoolchildren for a variety of educational expenses, including tuition. Witters v. 
Washington Department of Services for the Blina60 involved a grant to a blind person who wanted 
23
 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
24
 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
25
 444 U.S. 646 (1980). 
26




 413 U.S. 825 (1973). 
29
 463 U.S. 388(1983). 
30
 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
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to attend a religious college to prepare for a religious vocation under a state vocational 
rehabilitation program which provided educational assistance for a wide variety of vocations. In 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,31 the Court upheld a voucher program that assisted parents in failing 
public schools in Cleveland to send their children to private schools, most of which were 
sectarian. In each instance, the Court's rationale in upholding the programs was that the benefits 
were available on a religiously neutral basis and that sectarian schools benefited only indirectly as 
the result of the independent choices of students or their parents. In Zelman, the Court further 
held that the universe of choice open to parents was not limited to the private schools where the 
vouchers could be used, but included the full range of public school options open to them as well. 
In 2010, the Court heard arguments challenging an Arizona statute that allows individuals to 
claim a tax credit for donations that an individual makes to school tuition organizations.32 A 
school tuition organization is defined as a tax-exempt charitable organization that allocates 90% 
of its revenue for educational scholarships and tuition grants for children to attend a school of 
their parents' choice.33 The case presents a question of the constitutionality of government aid 
under the First Amendment because some school tuition organizations provide scholarships to 
religious schools only. The Court is expected to issue a decision in early 2011. 
Health and Nutrition Services 
The Court has in dicta repeatedly affirmed the constitutionality of the public subsidy of physician, 
nursing, dental, and optometric services to children in sectarian schools;34 and in Wolman v. 
Walter35 it specifically upheld the provision of diagnostic speech, hearing, and psychological 
services by public school personnel on sectarian school premises. In addition, the Court has 
repeatedly in dicta affirmed the constitutionality of the public subsidy of school lunches for 
eligible children in sectarian schools.36 
General Public Services 
In dicta in Everson v. Board of Education31 the Court affirmed as constitutional the provision of 
such general public services as police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, 
highways, and sidewalks to sectarian schools. According to the Court, the Establishment Clause 
does not require that religious schools be cut off from public services "so separate and so 
indisputably marked off from the religious function.... 
31
 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
32
 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, No. 09-987 (2010); Garriott v. Winn, No. 09-991 (2010). 
33
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 43-1089. 
34




 Lemon, 403 U.S. 602; Meek, 421 U.S. 349. 
37
 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
38/</.at18. 
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Specific Decisions Concerning Public Aid to 
Sectarian Colleges and Universities 
General Aid 
In Roemer v. Maryland Board of Public Works,39 the Court upheld a state program of 
noncategorical grants to all private colleges in the state, including ones that were church-
n ["filiated, because the program included a statutory restriction barring the use of the funds for 
sectarian purposes. The Court stressed that the church-related colleges that benefited were not 
"pervasively sectarian" and that the aid was statutorily restricted to secular use. 
Construction Assistance 
In Tilton v. Richardson,40 the Court upheld as constitutional a federal program that provided 
grants to colleges, including church-affiliated colleges, for the construction of needed facilities, 
so long as the facilities were not used for religious worship or sectarian instruction. The statute 
provided that the federal interest in any facility constructed with federal funds would expire after 
20 years, but the Court held that the nonsectarian use requirement would have to apply so long as 
the buildings had any viable use. Subsequently, in Hunt v. McNair4X the Court upheld a program 
in which a state issued revenue bonds to finance the construction of facilities at institutions of 
higher education, including those with a religious affiliation. The program barred the use of the 
funds for any facility used for sectarian instruction or religious worship. 
Student Publication Subsidy 
In Rosenberger v. The Rector and Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia4 the Court held 
that it would be constitutional for a state university to subsidize the printing costs of an avowedly 
religious student publication. The university made the subsidy available to non-religious student 
publications as a way of fostering student expression and discussion, and the Court held that it 
would constitute viewpoint discrimination in violation of the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment to deny the subsidy to a student publication offering a religious perspective. 
Vouchers 
In two summary affirmances, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of programs providing 
grants to students attending institutions of higher education, including religiously affiliated 
colleges. Both Smith v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina43 and Americans 
39
 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
40
 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
41
 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
42
 515 U.S. 819(1995). 
43
 429 F.Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C), afTd mem., 434 U.S. 803 (1977). 
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United for the Separation of Church and State v. Blanton44 involved grants given on the basis of 
need for students to use in attending either public or private colleges, including religiously 
affiliated ones. In affirming the decisions, the Supreme Court issued no opinion in either case, but 
the lower courts reasoned that the religious colleges benefited from the programs only if the 
students independently decided to attend. 
In Locke v. Davey*5 the Court considered the constitutionality of a state scholarship program that 
included a restriction on recipients that prohibited the use of scholarship funds to pursue 
devotional theological degrees. The Court noted that, because the recipient would make an 
independent choice regarding how to spend the funds, the federal Establishment Clause would not 
be violated by such a program.46 





 433 F.Supp. 97 (M.D. Tena), afPd mem., 434 U.S. 803 (1977). 
45
 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
46
 The issue that the Court faced in Locke was centered on a more restrictive prohibition on establishment of religion 
contained in the Washington state constitution. The state constitution required the prohibition on the use of state funds 
to pursue religious degrees, but the recipient challenged the restriction as a violation of the federal Free Exercise 
Clause. The Court held that the withholding of the funds did not improperly infringe on me federal right to free 
exercise. Id, 
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